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Abstract Scientific evaluation is a determinant of how scientists, institutions and
funders behave, and as such is a key element in the making of science. In this article,
we propose an alternative to the current norm of evaluating research with journal
rank. Following a well-defined notion of scientific value, we introduce qualitative
processes that can also be quantified and give rise to meaningful and easy-to-use
article-level metrics. In our approach, the goal of a scientist is transformed from
convincing an editorial board through a vertical process to convincing peers through
an horizontal one. We argue that such an evaluation system naturally provides the
incentives and logic needed to constantly promote quality, reproducibility, openness
and collaboration in science. The system is legally and technically feasible and can
gradually lead to the self-organized reappropriation of the scientific process by the
scholarly community and its institutions. We propose an implementation of our eval-
uation system with the platform “the Self-Journals of Science” (www.sjscience.org)
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1 Introduction: the inherent shortcomings of an asym-
metric evaluation system
Criticism of the current academic evaluation system traditionally focuses on the
problematic use of journal reputation as a proxy for scientific quality. However, the
harm caused by the research community’s dependency on academic journals is more
unsettling and destabilizing than we usually think. Journal-based evaluation creates
an asymmetry within the scientific community between a minority of scientists sitting
in editorial boards, who have the exclusive power to give value to a scientific article
by accepting it in their journal, and the vast majority of scholars who strive to
convince editors that their articles are highly citable in order to secure one of the
limited publication slots, vital for academic career advancement.
In this system of value creation, scientific recognition is artificially turned into
a resource of predetermined scarcity for which scholars have to compete. In one
camp, members of the scientific community must compete for limited space in a
few “top” journals, which can impede the natural unrestricted progress of science by
disincentivizing open research and collaboration. In the other camp, a low number
of editors must also contend with each other for exclusive content to increase the
reputation of their journal, a process that can have strong negative effects on scientific
output and on the research enterprise as a whole. Although many scholars wear both
hats –being authors and journal editors at the same time– here we do not identify
the problem in individual agents but rather in the roles themselves and the power
relationship between them. Thus, we argue that it is not only the kind of value that
is promoted by the current system that is questionable (journal prestige and ‘impact’,
as in impact factor): more importantly, it is the way the system produces value and
how its implicit asymmetric power structure is detrimental to scientific progress.
This fundamental problem must be addressed by any proposed alternative.
In the rest of this introduction we highlight some of the most important conse-
quences of this asymmetry.
1.1 Peer-trials undermine scientific peer-review.
Peer-review is a founding principle of science. It is the process through which the
community debates over the validity of a scientific proposition. It allows science to
be self-correcting and to develop beyond the prejudices of the few.
In the current publishing environment, since scientists are competing for the
same limited resources, relations between peers can become inherently conflictive.
For instance, scientists working on the same topic may tend to avoid each other for
as long as possible so as not to be scooped by a competitor, whereas collectively it
is likely that they would have benefited most from mutual interaction during the
early research stages. The most worrying consequence of peers’ diverging interests
is that debating becomes socially difficult –if not impossible– in the context of a
journal. The rejection and downgrade of an article to a lower-ranked journal can be
a direct consequence of a scientific disagreement that few people would openly take
3
responsibility for, to avoid reprisals.
While the reliability of science comes from its verifiability, today it is being
validated by a process which lacks this very property. Journal’s peer-review is
not a community-wide debate but a gatekeeping process tied to the local policy
of an editorial board, where a small number of people hold temporary authority
over an article, and whose goal is to support a binary decision or acceptance of
rejection within some deadlines. We propose to rather refer to journal’s peer-review
as a ‘peer-trial’, a term that in our opinion better accounts for its goal and the
social dynamics at work behind it. Since peer-trials necessarily involve a degree of
confidentiality and secrecy, and since they are limited in time, many errors, biases
and conflicts of interest [1, 2, 3, 4] may arise without the possibility of correction. In
that sense, peer-trials are questionable as a scientific process.
The peer-trial has become the standard in scientific publishing for the past 60
years [5, 6], and is the only modus operandi that the current generation of scientists
has known, entrenching the belief that passing them is equivalent to attaining scien-
tific validity. This is not to say that they are unfair, unuseful, or without intellectual
added-value when all participants are competent, genuinely committed and have the
interests of scientific truth at heart. Surveys report that 90% of authors, whose
article has been accepted, feel that peer-trial had improved it [7, 8]. Nevertheless,
this is not a guarantee of scientific validity. Limitations in time and the insufficiency
of available competences mean that a perceived improvement does not necessarily
achieve high scientific standards [9] as expressed, for instance, by the general misuse
of statistics in biomedical sciences [10, 11].
Moreover, improving scientific validity after a peer-trial process is quite different
from evaluating scientific innovation. Articles that may best contribute to the
progress of science are often unexpected or disruptive to the status quo [12]. It
is precisely in this context that the peer-trial format is most likely to fail and go
wrong [13], with unverifiable shortfalls for science.
While peer-trial still dominates the mainstream, there are strong signs that the
scientific community is actively engaged in a more continuous process of validation.
Browsing websites such as PubPeer or Publons (where “post-print peer-review” is
possible) makes it clear that, although articles are improved with respect to initial
submission, the discussion process continues long after publication and that the
evolution of articles is a more dynamic construct [14]. This is at odds with the
world of undisclosed email dialogues between authors and editors, and reviewers and
editors during the peer-trial process.
The unaccountability of peer-trials have further systemic consequences. For
instance, referees cannot be credited for their work and institutions are led to
promote a one-dimensional definition of scientists’ utility, that would only rely on
their productivity, and whose latest avatar is the h-index [15].
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1.2 Competition between journals excludes research with per-
ceived low impact.
Editors cannot afford to neglect the impact factor of their journal [16]. Instead, they
are motivated to inflate it by selecting articles that they think will be highly cited
in the following two years. This selection bias prioritizes research that is more likely
to trend at the expense of elements that are critical in the testing of scientific ideas
but not conducive to the increase of a journal’s impact factor (such as high-accuracy
experimental data that did not prove a “positive” effect, or replication studies).
1.3 Gaming the system results in low quality.
Since the value of an article at present is tied to being published in a journal, and
since peer-trials are not transparent, can be biased, are few in number and highly
variable in quality, scientists may be tempted to game the traditional publication
process. By gaming, we mean that a scientist may inappropriately generalize from
the trivial, avoid statistical rigour, mislead by an elegant narrative, exploit power
in the relationship between editors, reviewers and authors [17], or even use fake
identities [18] and commit fraud1 [19]. For instance, statistics from the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics on the culture of scientific research in the UK show that 58% of
survey respondents reported that they were aware of scientists feeling tempted/under
pressure to compromise on research integrity and standards, and one-third of scien-
tists under 35 reported feeling this pressure themselves [20]. The major consequence
of gaming is loss of quality which leads to irreproducible research getting the seal of
approval by the publishing system [21, 22, 23].
Once an article has been published, the editor may be reluctant to have a debate
open, whose outcome may damage the reputation of the journal [24, 25]. The ‘time-
to-retraction’ (i.e. the time from publication of an article to publication of retraction)
averages 32.91 months [26]. This is a concern for debate in science, especially in the
sphere of public health where clinical trials can already have reached an advanced
stage by this time [27]. There is a fundamental contradiction between the scientific
need to constantly and dynamically debate, test, refine or correct scientific claims,
and the private need of third parties to deliver and sell something as a static end-
product.
All of this can considerably delay or hinder the self-correction of science, result in
a waste of time and (public) money, and can have deleterious effects on the credibility
of science and what it produces.
1.4 Scientific conservatism is placing a brake on the pace of
change.
It is questionable whether any static subset of the scientific community could ap-
propriately manage the direction of science. Today’s highly-regarded researchers
1The latter can be followed on RetractionWatch, a blog which keeps an active record of retraction
cases, and investigate many.
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naturally tend to defend the paradigm that underpins their reputation, whilst op-
posing tomorrow’s ideas [28].
For example, in “The Dynamic State of Body Constituents” [29], Schoenheimer
tried to introduce the concept that proteins were broken down intracellularly (a fact
that we now take for granted, with the study of ubiquitin). However, it took more
than 30 years for this concept to be accepted, and likely delayed the discovery of
ubiquitin, in part because Nobel Laureate Jacques Monod was a proponent of the
theory that proteins, once formed, were ever present [30].
In science, good ideas may eventually prevail, but a lot of time and effort may
be mis-spent before they do. Though the beauty of the scientific method is to allow
humans to go beyond their own prejudices, the traditional publishing system is prone
to working in favor of the current dogma. The main mechanism of selection of editors
(i.e. co-opting between reputable researchers) is creating and enforcing additional
constraints and limits on the progress of science without the security of collective
wisdom.
To address these issues, in this article we introduce a model based on a novel,
open, and community-wide evaluation system that captures a well-defined notion
of scientific value and which is based on scientists’ collective intelligence and judge-
ment. We advocate that the inherent logic of our model may reverse the process
of privatization and fragmentation of evaluation associated with the use of journal
rankings. Moreover, the system is technically and legally feasible in the current
environment. In Section 2 we define scientific value, the methodology used to assess
it and associated metrics. In Section 3 we discuss the mechanics and merits of our
proposed model. In Section 4 we highlight some implications of this novel way of
evaluating research works in the context of a global competition for money, tenure
and honors. Our treatise is part of a broader vision that is also developed in [31]
and [32].
2 A symmetric process for the creation of scientific
value
In this section, we present a definition of scientific value and describe the open
and community-wide processes required to capture it. These processes maintain
symmetry in the creation of scientific value and fulfil what we consider the minimal
expectations from any desirable alternative evaluation system, which are:
1. to promote scientific quality.
2. to provide incentives to authors, reviewers and evaluators.
3. to promote academic collaboration instead of competition.
4. to be able to develop in parallel to current journal publication practices (as
long these remain essential for funding and career advancement).
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5. to propose article-level metrics that are easy to calculate and interpret.
6. to be verifiable and hard to game.
A prototype of an evaluation system driven by these processes is implemented
in “the Self-Journals of Science” (SJS, www.sjscience.org): an open, free and mul-
tidisciplinary platform that empowers scientists to achieve the creation of scientific
value. SJS is a horizontal environment for scientific assessment and communication
and is technically governed by an international organisation2 of volunteer research
scholars whose membership is free and open to the entire scientific community.
2.1 Scientific value as validity and importance
A scientific article relies on refutable statements that contribute to a body of knowl-
edge about the object of study. In this description of science, the value of an
article spans two distinct notions, that require their own assessment mechanisms:
the correctness of its statements, which we call its validity, and the value of its
contribution, which we call its importance.
The validity of an article is established by a process of open and objective debate
by the whole community. Since the contribution of a scientific article essentially relies
on refutable statements, debating them in principle 3 can eventually converge on a
consensus about whether it has reached accepted scientific standards (and what these
standards should be: methodological soundness, unambiguity of of presentation,
satisfaction of various protocols, inclusion of appropriate references, etc.) or whether
or not it needs further revision(s).
The importance of an article is the outcome of its perceived importance by
each member of the research community. This perceived importance is a subjec-
tive assessment that depends on personal knowledge and understanding, intuition,
and anticipation of future advances in the field. Unlike validity, the perception of
importance does not rely on refutable elements that could be used to automatically
resolve disagreements. Broad consensus is not expected based on the importance of
an article alone; for instance, scientists might rightfully diverge in their belief that
a certain path of development of their field is more valuable than another. The
importance of an article is thus socially determined and field, time and culture-
dependent.
The two different concepts cannot be measured by a single index: a methodolog-
ically valid article may not be important just as a trending article may prove to be
wrong. In the traditional system, these notions are merged and uniquely expressed
by a local, opaque and one-time event: journal publication.4
2www.openscholar.org.uk
3that is, in the limit of infinite time and infinite resources to test the statements
4In our implementation, we also introduce an addition notion priority which is of practical use
but not an index of quality of a scientific article. Nonetheless, we have introduced priority as a
simple counter that allows scientists to mark articles prior to thorough scrutiny in the same vein
as the “Like” button on Facebook. Priority is a short-term notion that does not imply a scientific
judgement and the reasons for prioritizing an article can be either positive (e.g. the article looks
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2.2 Assessing validity by open peer review
We have defined scientific peer-review as the community-wide debate through
which scientists aim to agree on the validity of a scientific item.
In our system, peer-review is an open and horizontal (i.e. a non-authoritative
and unmediated) debate between peers where “open” means transparent (i.e., signed),
open access (i.e., reviewer assessments are made public), non-exclusive (i.e., open to
all scholars), and open in time (i.e. immediate but also continuous). This brings
a new ethic to publishing [31]: the goal of peer-review is not to provide a one-time
certification expressed in the form of a binary decision of accept or reject as per the
traditional mode of publishing, rather it is to scientifically debate the validity of an
article with the aim of reaching an observable and stable degree of consensus. Here,
reviews are no longer authoritative mandates to revise an article, but elements of a
debate where peers are also equals. The influence of a review over an article is based
on its relevance or its ability to rally collective opinion, and on an open context
where authors cannot afford to let relevant criticism go unanswered.
The validity of an article is captured by a transparent and community-wide vote
between two options: “this article has reached scientific standards” 5 or “this article
still needs revisions”. The quantifiers of the validity of an article (i.e. its metrics)
are hence the number of scientists who voted, and the fraction who validated the
article. Any reader can instantly access the current state of the voting process which
is displayed at the header of the article (Figure 1).
In our proposed implementation of such open peer-review, we introduce other
features aimed at incentivizing positive interactions between participants and the
proper self-organization and self-regulation of the debate:
• Articles are interactive and reviews are appropriately embedded into them.
Reviews therefore benefit from the same visibility as the article.
• Reviews can be individually evaluated with a +/- vote system
• The vote “this article still needs revisions” must be substantiated by the writing
of a review or up-voting of an existing review.
• Upon revision, authors can select those reviews most useful to them and the
reviewers get proper acknowledgement in all subsequent versions of the article
- in their header (online) or in the cover page (PDF).
• The history of the article is always accessible.
interesting) or negative (it looks terrible and needs a quick refutation). Priority offers a instant
filter to help organize scientific output on a short-time scale, before assessment of its validity and
importance. The reason this is important is because it allows the system to channel misleading
short-term effects (such as those of a promising abstract combined with an overstating narrative)
into an index that is different from that used for scientific evaluation.
5The notion of “scientific standard” is not enforced by any authority but is dynamically defined
by the majority vote that follows a global conversation about each article.
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In this form of self-publishing, scientific articles become dynamic [14], authors
become active in energizing a peer-review process [33] whose quality is driven by
collective intelligence in a symmetric environment where the best scientific ideas are
subjected to natural selection [34]. The process produces a text initially written by
its authors but which also includes the debate it has generated within the community.
Figure 1: Header of an article uploaded on SJS. It features its validity (a), its curators
(b) and its priority (c) (see footnote 4). Each of these metrics is transparent and the
identity of scholars who contributed to them can be accessed with the “Who?” button
2.3 Assessing importance with self-journals
Importance vs impact. A fundamental difference between our understanding of
importance and the notion of impact as measured through citations (e.g., the impact
factor, the journal citation distribution [35] or the RCR [36]) or usage statistics (e.g.
number of tweets, hits, downloads, etc), is that importance should be explicitly and
directly related to a scientist’s judgement. In that sense, metrics of impact do not
necessarily convey useful or separable information about importance.
As for citation-based metrics, we argue that a citation is not an endorsement of
the article we cite. For instance, we will cite an article we may want to scientifically
refute; citations may be included so as to please an anonymous referee [37]; we
often cite review articles instead of original articles, or we simply copy and paste or
incorrectly cite without reading the actual articles [38]. Also, the narrow context
of our own publications may not be relevant to cite and give credit to articles that
have, however, been important to us.
Usage statistics (altmetrics) are even less reliable since they can be massively
gamed and may be derived from sources unrelated to science, or even from a plethora
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of ghost accounts on social media.
Self-Journals. In our alternative evaluation system we introduce the concept of
self-journals as a way for scientists to properly express their judgement regarding an
article’s importance for a specific field. A self-journal is a novel means of personal
scientific communication; it can be thought of as a scholarly journal attached to each
individual scientist that works on the curation of any scientific item available on the
Web via hyperlinks (and not on appropriation of articles following a submission
process).
A self-journal is released into structured issues, which are collections of articles
around a certain topic. Every issue has its own title and editorial providing an
introduction for the community and must contain a minimal number of articles (in
our implementation, we set this minimum to 4). The curator has the possibility
to provide personal comments on each article that has been curated in the issue
(for concrete examples, please check the first issue of the self-journal of Sanli Faez,
Konrad Hinsen or Michaël Bon). The consistency of the selection of articles and
the relevance of the personal comments determine the scientific added value of each
self-journal issue. Every scientist can curate their own self-journal, through which
they can release as many issues on as may topics as they please. Curators can
take advantage of self-journals to review a field, present a promising way to develop
it, offer a comprehensive collection of their own research, host the proceedings of
a workshop or a journal club, or popularize scientific ideas and discoveries etc. A
self-journal reflects the scientific vision of its curator and bears his or her signature.
Interested readers can freely subscribe to a self-journal and get notified whenever a
new issue is released.
An ecosystem of self-journals offers a way to quantify the importance of an article,
primarily by the number of its curators.
3 Benefits of this evaluation system
The evaluation system we propose generates easy-to-use article-level metrics for
validity (the number of scholars engaged in peer-review and the fraction of them who
consider that the article is up to scientific standards) and for importance (the number
of scholars who have curated the article in their self-journal). Such metrics can
progress in parallel to existing publication practices and metrics. On the one hand,
the assessment of importance through curation via hyperlinks can apply immediately
to all scientific literature on the Web, irrespective of its legal owners. On the other
hand, the assessment of validity requires only the uploading of author-copyrighted
content or pre-prints – a practice which is already standard in some fields such
as physics, and gaining momentum in others such as biology [39] (see for instance
ASAPBio). Below we discuss how this evaluation system satisfies the properties that
we laid out in section 2 and the benefits it provides.
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3.1 Avoiding conflicts in evaluation
Competition for an abundant resource promotes actively collaborative
behaviour. In our evaluation system, the conflict-creating competition for rare
slots in a top journal is replaced by a competition for open peer recognition which is
abundant and non-exclusive. Giving recognition to a peer does not deprive somebody
else of it; an important article does not rise at the expenses of any other article. In
this symmetric recognition-based economy of knowledge where scholars are at the
same time authors, reviewers and evaluators of science, all scholars can give value to
their peers and are potential benefactors of each other. To get the attention of peers
and convince them of your scientific merits, the best strategy (in the sense of game
theory) is to pay attention to their work and rightfully give them the recognition
they deserve in a way which lets your own expertise publicly shine. This is exactly
what is achieved by self-journals and open peer review.
Convergent interests in open peer-review. Peer-review is transformed
from an authoritative trial into an open, transparent and unmediated scientific
conversation. It does not assume which participants (either authors or reviewers)
will be right in advance and does not result in a definitive and binary decision of
acceptance or rejection of an article. Then, openly disagreeing on a constructive basis
becomes an opportunity for both the author and the reviewer to gain recognition,
both from each other and from the rest of the community.
• For authors, an ongoing expert debate raises the level of awareness of their
article among the community. A spontaneous, signed and relevant critique is
delighting evidence that a peer cared and gave some thought to their article.
The reviewer may eventually turn into a curator once appropriate answers have
been given. A live process of improvement of the work under review is also the
best way to convince other readers that articles and research results are valid.
• For reviewers, credit is received for their public display of expertise, enhancing
their reputation within the community. Their reviews become an integral part
of the paper and are visible in all its instances and they directly benefit from
helping raise the visibility of the article they have chosen to review. In this way,
reviewers get special credit and are incentivized to be relevant, constructive and
courteous. The public display of expertise by engaging authors in discussion
will prove beneficial to reviewers at a later stage when they author their own
papers, as their reputation within the community is enhanced also by the
quality of their ability to review.
No conflict in the assessment of importance. The assessment of importance
is also devoid of any conflicts. A self-journal is a personal tool whose content,
topics of interest and release dates are completely up to its curator and his or her
private interests, policy and communication strategy. There is no submission process;
articles are freely picked by the curators according to the message they would like to
deliver to the community in the next issue of their self-journal. The consequence of
this is that no single article can be expected to be curated by a specific self-journal.
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An unimportant article is simply characterized by the fact that it remains in its
default state with no curator, and not by any explicit and conflictive statement that
it is unimportant coming from somebody in particular. The act of assessment of
importance by openly taking responsibility to include such an article in an issue of
one’s own self-journal, can only be positive by mutually increasing the visibility of
both.
3.2 Incentives for maintaining one’s self-journal
Incentives in the absence of official recognition by institutions and funders.
Self-journals have their own rationale. Firstly, they are a means of personal scientific
communication that allow their curators to elaborate on an individual vision of
science with the necessary depth they see fit. A self-journal therefore provides
a great scientific service to its readers by providing a level of consistency in the
interpretation and analysis of scientific output. In return, this service benefits
curators who increase their visibility and influence over what is disseminated to the
community. Self-journals give new freedom and scope to the editing process since
curation, as proposed here, applies to any research work with an Internet reference.
In other words, a mechanism is provided that allows scientists to fully express an
aspect of their individual worth that is absent in the current system, and build a
reputation accordingly.
A response is also provided to the problem of the decreasing visibility of authors,
articles and reviewers as the volume of scientists and scientific works grows on the
Web. Each issue of a self-journal acts as a pole of attraction that is likely to
have a minimum audience: the authors whose articles have been curated can be
notified about what is being said about their work, and may want to follow the
curator. Moreover, on a platform like SJS where the ecosystem of self-journals is
well integrated, interest for a particular article can guide readers to self-journal
issues where it has been uniquely commented on and contextualized in relation to
other articles.
We wish to emphasize that the interest value of a particular self-journal issue does
not lie so much in the intrinsic value of the articles selected, but rather in the specific
comments and collective perspective that is being given to them. Consequently, if
a certain article is curated by a “reputable” scientist, its other curators will not lose
value or visibility - even when their issues contain exactly the same articles; differ-
ent self-journal issues can always maintain independent interests. Every scientist
therefore has both a short-term and long-term personal interest in maintaining a
self-journal, and in reading those of their peers.
It is also worth mentioning that the expected primary use of a self-journal -
sharing one’s vision of a field, is not time-consuming as scientists have already
developed such visions in the course of their research whenever they have produced
a bibliography. Maintenance of a self-journal in this case is reduced to the time it
takes to select the most important articles and to write useful comments if desired.
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Incentives with official recognition by institutions and funders. If, as an
evaluation system, self-journals attract the attention of institutions and funders, then
the incentive for maintaining one’s own self-journal is clear: it is an indispensable tool
for self-promotion that allows everyone to have a share in the direction of evolution
of their field. That power, which is today in the hands of editors in a top-down
certification system, will be redistributed horizontally amongst scientists who are
collectively co-responsible for validation and evaluation and are properly credited
for doing it well. Growing awareness of the positive impact of ease-of-access to
validated, important-ranked and credible science, as well as the increase in scientific
value given to researchers and, by proxy, their institutes and funding bodies, will help
generate momentum for the mass adoption of self-journals and open peer-review. In
turn, mass adoption is what will bring the power and richness of this evaluation
system at its peak.
3.3 Promotion of scientific quality
The need for quality curation. To gain followers, readers and influence, sci-
entists should maintain a thoughtful and interesting self-journal. In other words,
they are incentivized to be good evaluators, i.e. to carefully select and curate rele-
vant collections of articles in issues and enhance them with enlightening comments.
Scientists that mechanically curate all articles in their field (akin to copy-pasting
entire bibliographies) without adding value by providing comments or constructive
criticism, will receive less attention and influence than one who focusses on quality.
Moreover, because of the need for structure and the writing of an editorial for
each issue, self-journals are not automatons. They are not a time feed to which
articles are appended in a single click and where the latest additions decrease the
visibility of prior additions (something that can occur on very short timescales e.g.
minutes), such as in other environments. This “friction” ensures that self-journal
issues will be released only when a curator has a point to make, and that qualitative
strategies are more efficient than quantitative ones when the aim is to get as large
audience as possible within the scientific community.
Thus, unlike simple popularity contests (such as the number of “Likes” on Face-
book), there are a feedback loop and constraints acting on the quality of the self-
journal itself which encourages its curator only to include articles that reach his or
her standards.
Curation recognizes works necessary to the progress of science. The value
of a self-journal built on the validity and importance of its articles is driven by
the scientific interest and relevance of the vision developed by its curator, and
not because it has monopolized the distribution of highly-citable articles as is the
current situation. Consequently, as an evaluation system, it liberates articles that are
essential to scientific progress which are today penalized because they are believed
to be less citable (e.g. replication studies or reports of valid results which failed to
prove the author’s hypothesis; often unwisely referred to as “negative” results). Such
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contributions are as important to the scientific method as reports of statistically-
significant effects, especially in the empirical sciences. When providing their analysis
of a certain topic, curators are now free to integrate items they see as important to
making their point as convincing as possible.
In the case of replication studies there is actually an incentive for their curation.
Scholars who have already curated a particular standard are interested in knowing
whether or not a certain claim has been confirmed or refuted. Thus, it is likely that
the replication of an original result will benefit from the same level of curation as the
original article. This also means that a laboratory which is considering replicating a
result can have an a priori estimate of the publishing reward expected for investing
time in performing an experiment. Results that are regarded as important and highly
curated provide a stronger incentive for their replication. This provides a novel
positive feedback mechanism and impetus for science to move forward confidently,
since major results will be verified.
3.4 No artificial constraint on time, space and format
Unlike academic journals, self-journals are not expected to curate only the most
recent articles. It is in a curator’s best interest to provide a mix of both past
and present articles when creating a deep and comprehensive vision of their field
[40]. For an article, this implies that its evaluation span becomes time-dependent.
For instance, a disruptive innovation which is gradually understood will become
increasingly curated and reach high importance even if the author was the only one
to understand it at the beginning of the process.
Furthermore, linked data that results from hyperlinking content frees self-journals
from space and format restrictions, present in the current mode of publishing. By
this we mean that the content of self-journals is not constrained to any particular
type of scientific item (article, thesis, conference proceeding, poster, essay, technical
report etc), design format or storage requirement. This mode of evaluation then,
gives the scientific community a certain freedom to evolve the format of articles
according to its needs.
3.5 Robustness to gaming and biases
Here we highlight how the inherent logic of this evaluation system and its horizontal
power structure, fight against gaming and human biases. However, it is clearly
impossible for us to be sure how a culturally diverse population of millions people,
subjected to different local constraints, would behave in such an environment. We are
therefore looking for as many feedbacks as possible on this topic as well as practical
tests.
Gaming. The metrics we propose are established by open and community-
wide processes which make them hard to game. For instance, unlike citations and
usage statistics, two accomplices are unable to create an infinite loop that boosts
the importance of each other’s articles. This is because the primary quantifier is the
number of curators rather than the number of self-journal issues in which an article
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appears (which would become analogous to journal citation). If a scientist exploits
friendship bias (i.e. they curate articles of an acquaintance multiple times), they
would only increase their index by +1. At the same time, their self-journal would
lose credibility in the eyes of the community and damage their reputation. Gaming
a truly open peer-review and evaluation system like the one proposed here, would
imply a successful manipulation of a significant fraction of the scientific community
in open and transparent processes or involves the (highly unlikely) joint individual
misconduct of a large fraction of scientists which is easy to expose as it is large. The
difficulty of these scenarios and the ease at which they can backfire strongly dissuade
them.
Note that this evaluation approach does not assume that the majority of members
of the scientific community are virtuous either. It is peer pressure which naturally
and constantly exerts itself to enforce the highest scientific standards everywhere.
In such an environment, the best self-interest of each scientist is aligned with the
ethical requirements of science. There is no way to get recognition other than making
valuable contributions to scientific knowledge, be it in the form of articles, reviews
or a self-journal.
Finally, since these processes of peer-review and curation are not locked up in a
proprietary database, the research community is free – and expected – to develop
open source modules that can detect anomalous behaviors and properly address any
gaming scenario. Such modules could be for instance integrated in search engines for
signaling, or could be run independently. They will enforce further self-regulation
and can demonstrate the reliability of these processes as they gain momentum as an
evaluation system.
Biases. Similarly, the absence of vertical relationship between scientists (be-
ing replaced with horizontal and reciprocal ones) and the full transparency and
accountability of the system, combine to oppose the negative expression of human
biases with respect to specific works or fellows (i.e. conflicts of interest, gender-,
race-, age-, country-based biases, etc.) For instance, the fact that reviews are not
authoritative and are themselves subjected to peer scrutiny (with the possibility of
being evaluated with a +/- voting system and being refuted by the authors when
irrelevant) strongly incentivizes reviewers to strengthen valid scientific arguments.
Doing otherwise might backfire and negatively impact the reputation of the (always
non-anonymous) reviewer. In the logic of our system, relevant reviews contribute
to attracting the attention of the community and give life to an article. Therefore,
even if a reviewer wants to criticize an article because of a personal bias against
the authors, the need to do so in accordance with high scientific standards actually
results in a benefit to the authors.
Moreover, every scientist is generally incentivized not to express negative biases
against their peers because they are the ones with the freedom and power to endow
value to their works. Thus, failing to reach a subgroup of peers for reasons other than
science goes against the interests of the scientist, who may suffer from a shortfall in
the evaluation of his or her works.
In addition to deflecting or opposing the negative expression of a bias, the
system possibly also offers a long-term opportunity for a desirable cultural evolution
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in relation to disfavored minority groups. The visibility of their individuals no
longer depends on a self-reproducing vertical power structure which can limit their
contributions (e.g. by making it harder for them to participate in the publishing
process as an anonymous reviewer or editor). Rather, they can autonomously and
publicly express their value in all dimensions of the scientific activity. This is an
opportunity for them to take, that cannot go unseen by the community, and which
will help form the mindset of future generations.
3.6 No loss of information
The current ubiquitous use of indices in decision-making by administrative structures
and funders enforces the constraint that our evaluation system generates numbers
so that it can be easily adopted and recognized. We have therefore proposed article-
level metrics for validity and importance, but it is obvious that expressing something
as complex as scientific value in the form of a few numbers inevitably implies a loss
of information. The quantifiers proposed here are mere tools to provide a first sound
and reliable picture of what is valid and important in science, and we argue that they
are in many respects preferable to journal rankings and impact factors in capturing
scientific value.
However, in our evaluation system, the qualitative processes underlying the com-
putation of our metrics remain fully accessible and they offer much richer and
accurate information that can and should be made use of. An ecosystem of self-
journals provides a context in which an article can be appreciated via its relationship
to the other articles of the issues in which it has been curated. The perspective
of curators is explicitly expressed in narrative form via editorials and individual
comments. Science can be followed in many additional ways: by following the
activity of specific scientists (i.e. what they publish, review and curate) that one
considers to have better skills than the rest, by following the activity and connections
developing around specific articles, by reading self-journals. Networks of co-curated
articles, of authors, of reviewers and curators can be easily studied in a systematic
and automatable fashion. The collective intelligence of the scientific community can
be dug as deep as necessary by all users, and according to their needs.
This complete and easy-to-process information displays a diversity of approaches
that opposes an evolution of our evaluation system into another “tyranny of the
metrics”, where the only visible articles would be those which rank at the top
according to our quantifiers.
3.7 Acceleration of the adoption or debunking of novel ideas
The traditional publishing system has an inherent conservatism but also the struc-
tural means to slow down the adoption of disruptive ideas if not “believed” by
dominant voices. Such mechanisms exploit the asymmetry of the evaluation system
and are absent from the self-journal system. However, self-journals alone are not
sufficient to overcome the natural reluctance of a community to adopt novel ideas.
There is inertia. Ideas may be expressed by authors’ articles and self-journals but
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lack of peer commentary by the community is a challenge also for the use of collective
intelligence for building scientific value. Our argument is that rewardable open peer-
review is the motivator and accelerator of such a process. Indeed, the author of a
disruptive idea can contribute as a reviewer of peer articles and accordingly point
out their possible shortcomings; the community will eventually be triggered into
noticing the novel idea and responding - leading either to its more rapid adoption or
debunking.
3.8 Full achievement of Open Science
The way that self-journals create scientific value produces an additional mechanism
that triggers openness. When the goal of a scientist is shifted to convincing as
large a section of the community as possible (and not simply matching the minimal
standards of a journal policy), those who practice open science have an advantage
over those who do not. Ensuring that the full text of article, data and code are all
freely and openly available, is the vehicle for maximizing the potential for getting
positive feedback from the community. If, for instance, data is not made available,
members of the community are likely to conclude that the article cannot be validated
(since it cannot be tested), and the authors will be penalized. With the evaluation
system we propose, total openness is in the self-interest of every scientist and occurs
naturally without the need for top-down mandates or bureaucracy.
We believe that the correct battle for Open Science is the one for the metrics
that reward it. Community-based metrics re-empower the average scientist, while at
the same time providing incentives to energize and reward collective participation.
They will strengthen and reach beyond open access. Paradoxically this battle is also
much easier than that for open access since it only depends on scientists and not on
what legacy publishers can think or do.
Moreover, since the assessment of validity and importance of articles takes place in
a self-organized and self-regulated way, there are no intermediaries between scientists
and the direct costs of scholarly communication are reduced to the cost of storage.
This is presently tiny in comparison with what is currently being paid by institutions
to legacy publishers whether in the form of journal subscriptions or article processing
and open access charges. It will fulfil the early promise that open access would
decrease costs, which is unlikely to be the case following the current policy to expect
journals to flip their business model to “gold” publishing (a model which becomes
prevalent in the UK and the EU following legal requirements).
4 Implications for the evaluation of scientists
The competition between scientists for money, tenure and honor is necessarily com-
petitive since these resources are scarce. We believe that this inevitable competition
does not de facto negatively affect the quality of science. However, the current terms
of this competition definitely do (i.e. striving to secure rare publications slots in top
journals as a stamp of approval). Instead, we propose a community evaluation system
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that removes what is an artificial construct - the rarity of scientific recognition. In
our model, the quest for individual recognition does not succeed at the expenses
of peers; rather it originates from open and fruitful interactions with peers. In the
terms of our model, the competition for money, tenure and individual honor drives
scientists to adopt a collaborative behaviour.
This apparent paradox is not a contradiction because our processes of evaluation
are global, while money, positions and prestige are delivered through local processes
that involve a minority of the scientific community. For instance, it is clear that
two scientists competing for the same position will hardly sing each other’s praises.
However, the evaluation of their work will depend mostly on what the rest of the
community thinks, and in their attempt to get this positive feedback, the contenders
will have had to perform openly valid and important research, write thoughtful
reviews, and maintain an enlightening self-journal – all things good for the progress
of science. In the current system, even if they do not apply to the same grants,
scientists working on the same topic are always a threat to each other - because the
one who will publish first will mechanically shrink the value of the other6.
Therefore, we argue that the gradual adoption of the quantifiers we introduce
here by institutions and funders will inject positive incentives for both quality and
openness into the scientific community. The precise way that such quantifiers will
be assimilated in internal processes is a choice that is political in nature an is the
responsibility of those who want to evaluate researchers. It will depend on their
specific goals, vision and the particularities of how best to fund science and honour
scientists at the local level. If an institution can adopt the h-index, it can devise
a similar index based on our quantifiers that will have a sounder scientific basis
and produce positive systemic implications. Also, the modus operandi of evaluation
commitees can evolve because their members can now have access to the collective
intelligence of scientists who have already thought about and contextualized the
articles upon which funding decisions and assignment of prestige will be based. It
will be much easier and intellectually satisfying for grant reviewers who will now
have access to a whole range of explicit judgements already expressed by peers. A
major incentive is that, for members of evaluation committees who cannot read full
articles, reading such judgements is less time-consuming, while providing a scientific
safeguard and diversity they may have lacked otherwise.
Finally, our evaluation model creates the potential for also taking into account
the reviewing and curation activity of a scientist. Since these activities have an
accountable influence on the course of science, they provide an impetus for many
institutions (especially those struggling to compete with “centres of excellence”) to
push for a multi-dimensional approach to assessing a scientist’s value, and develop
6For instance, when two different labs conduct similar research and submit similar results, editors
will tend to publish the article that is first submitted to them because journal prestige relies on
citation counts, and science usage is such that due to anteriority it will be the one that accrues
the most citations. Conversely, in the self-journal system, articles with similar results are likely be
curated in pair, and therefore have similar levels of importance since the point that the curator
may want to make based on them will be strengthened by the inclusion of two independent and
convergent studies.
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policy accordingly. Just as journal-based evaluation has brought the publish-or-
perish culture, our metrics can help recreate the sense of community now lacking in
science. When such a different mindset is generalized, novel models of funding can
also become possible such as the decentralized approach proposed in [41].
5 Conclusion: towards a practical change
We have proposed and described an evaluation system that promotes a well-defined
notion of scientific value in which objective and subjective aspects are disentangled
as validity and importance. The system restores a global conversation between
scientists and gives control of the evolution of science back to the scientific community
through open and horizontal processes, while at the same time incentivizing fruitful
interactions between peers. The system also generates novel metrics that are as
easy to use as the impact factor in the context of institutional evaluation or grant
reviewing. It can progress in a bottom-up fashion without conflicting with current
practices of publication. Since this system gives every scientist autonomous means to
review and evaluate all scientific items, we consider it to be of great appeal especially
to those who lack such means at present – the junior scientists. We particularly
encourage them to realize that it is their self-interest to nourish such an alternative
evaluation system and reshape the power structure of tomorrow’s science.
The evolution we are looking forward to is not an utopia. The science world
already has a shining example of a bottom-up achievement initially powered by junior
scientists: the pre-print server arXiv.org. Built in the 1990s by Paul Ginsparg, it
offered a service of objective scientific value and rose out of the concrete needs of
a community which supported and maintained it, despite not offering any reward
in terms of institutional evaluation. Today it has become the main portal where
physicists, mathematicians and computer scientists share their work in the form
of preprints which are often cited more than analogous journal publications. This
practice is now self-evident for these communities.
We further propose an implementation of the ideas developed in this article in
the form of SJS, an open platform for curation and peer-review, governed by an
open-membership organisation of volunteer scholars7. We believe SJS could become
a new multidisciplinary agora where scholars can co-validate and co-evaluate their
research products while receiving, at the same time, proper recognition that can
translate into both direct and immediate career benefits. Maintaining a self-journal
is a rewarding, simple and risk-free activity for scientists, and debating with peers
is natural in our community. We look forward to watching this academic ecosystem
grow, self-organize and evolve in the years ahead.
7www.openscholar.org.uk
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